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Abstract 
The J. A. C. Thomas Lecture delivered at University College London on 15 March 2001. A 
discussion of the relationship of Scots law with English law with specific reference to the 
example of contract law, arguing that it well illustrates the way in which a mixed legal 
system can develop, both avoiding the destruction of its Civilian characteristics and 
absorbing Common Law ones on a basis of critical and rational choice between alternatives. 
The paper concludes by looking at two recent examples of the process in connection with the 
law of specific implement and also spousal guarantees of husband's business debts. 
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“Scots and English law: the case of contract”, (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 205-229. 
 
Scots and English Law: The Case of Contract  
 
Hector L. MacQueen*  
 
I know of Tony Thomas only through his published works – notably his Textbook of 
Roman Law and the contract casebook which he edited along with J C Smith – and 
through the glowing tributes paid to him by other scholars in their writings1 and in 
conversations with me over the years.  What I did not fully realise until a few years ago 
was how much time he had spent – ten years in all - at the Law School at Glasgow 
University, the last seven of them as Douglas Professor of Civil Law.  In his history of 
the Glasgow Law School, David Walker pays an unusually warm tribute to him and his 
work: ‘Tony was a kenspeckle figure with horn-rimmed glasses and a bow tie.  He was 
learned, had high standards and a real love of Roman law.’2  Professor Thomas’ 
teaching and scholarship at Glasgow had a profound influence on at least three other 
Scots who have subsequently made – and continue to make - outstanding contributions 
to the field of Roman and Civil Law, namely Alan Watson, Alan Rodger and Bill 
Gordon.  I spoke with Alan Rodger about Tony Thomas just a week ago, and was 
amused when virtually the first thing Alan mentioned was the bow tie – obviously 
something which made a great impression in the Scotland of the 1950s and 1960s.  It is 
therefore a particular pleasure and a privilege to follow in the footsteps of many others 
who have come down from Scotland to offer a lecture in honour of the memory of Tony 
Thomas.3  I hope that my subject, the relationship between the Scots and the English 
laws of contract, will not seem too far removed from at least one of his interests. 
 
 The lecture topic springs from personal experiences over the last few years, and I 
would like to begin by listing these and explaining the chains of thought to which they 
gave rise.  First in time, and probably foremost, was a commission to write, with 
Professor Joe Thomson of Glasgow, a student text on Contract Law in Scotland.4  Our 
strong feeling was that this book was, amongst other things, an opportunity to make the 
Scots law of contract more accessible to those approaching it from a background in 
other legal systems.  Equally we wanted to expose students to something of the benefits 
of comparative study of contract law in other jurisdictions.  Where should English law 
be fitted into this approach?  It was evident that English law and English cases should 
not be referred to merely for comparative purposes, since their use in the development 
of Scots law went significantly further than that; on the other hand, we wanted to 
                                                 
* Professor of Private Law, University of Edinburgh. This is a lightly revised version of the J. A. C. Thomas 
Lecture delivered at University College London on 15 March 2001. Several Edinburgh colleagues, all 
named elsewhere in the footnotes, commented helpfully on the first draft, as did Reinhard Zimmermann.  
Error liability is however mine alone. 
1 Notably by my then Edinburgh colleague Peter Birks, delivering the very first Thomas Lecture: ‘English 
and Roman learning in Moses v Macferlan’ (1984) 37 CLP 1 at 1-2.  See also P. G. Stein and A. D. E. Lewis 
(eds.), Studies in Justinian’s Institutes in Memory of J. A. C. Thomas (London, 1983), and the commemorative 
note therein, contributed by J. C. Smith.  
2 D. M. Walker, A History of the School of Law: the University of Glasgow (Glasgow, 1990), p. 73. ‘Kenspeckle’ = 
‘easily recognizable, conspicuous, familiar; a mark by which a person or thing may be known or recognized’ 
(M. Robinson (ed.), Concise Scots Dictionary (Edinburgh, 1985), sv). 
3 Apart from Birks’ lecture cited in n. 1, see A. Rodger, ‘Mrs Donoghue and Alfenus Varus’, (1988) 41 
CLP 1; D Johnston, ‘Appointments and disappointments: White v Jones in Rome and today’ (2000) 53 CLP 
283. 
4 (Edinburgh, 2000). 
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emphasise the Scottish material on the subject, since that is what non-Scots would look 
for from Scottish authors. 
 
 The second experience began when in 1995 I joined the Commission for 
European Contract Law headed by Professor Ole Lando of Copenhagen, replacing the 
late Bill Wilson.5  The Commission is an attempt to create a contract law suitable for 
use in the European Union.  It is made up of a representative group of lawyers from 
every jurisdiction in the Union, including England and Scotland.  The aim is to produce 
a body of contract principles which will facilitate cross-border trade in Europe, provide 
an infrastructure upon which specific harmonisation projects in the field may be built, 
and give a model for the development of contract law and teaching in the Member 
States.  Publication began in 1995 and should be complete in the next year or so.   
 
The volumes containing the Principles include not only the texts but also an 
expository commentary and notes comparing the Commission’s rules with the national 
laws of the Member States.  The process of revising the national notes, prepared by my 
predecessor for the first volume of the Principles, revealed to me a picture of the Scots 
law of contract essentially aligning it with the Common Law traditions of England and 
Ireland.  The notes in general seemed to have a division between the Continental 
codified systems and the case law ones of the British isles; in the latter, English law 
naturally loomed largest, and the comment which then followed would often be along 
the lines, ‘Scots and Irish law are the same/similar’.  Of course, my comment here is a 
generalisation and by no means always did it hold good; but the experience led me to 
wonder whether there was indeed anything truly distinctive in the Scots law of contract.  
It also puzzled me that the Principles were intended, amongst their many other aims, to 
act as a bridge between the Continental and the Common Law traditions, and that Scots 
law, as the only European system mixing these two traditions, did not receive more 
attention in this regard.  Was it because it did not deserve to do so, or because it was 
not such a mixture as I had always been told? 
 
That question has inspired a good deal of my work on contract law since 1995, 
not least in the preparation of further national notes for subsequent volumes of the 
Principles, and I will elaborate upon some of my conclusions later on in this lecture.  
But before I go on to that, let me add in another couple of experiences that caused me to 
reflect upon the relationship of Scots and English contract law.  One was that of being 
Scottish editor for the new edition of Atiyah’s Sale of Goods, under the guiding hand of 
John Adams.6  There is a good deal of general contract law in that book, and rather 
unexpectedly I found myself having to write paragraphs at the beginning or end of some 
quite lengthy exposition, saying in effect that none of the following, or of the above, as 
the case might be, was applicable to Scotland: for example, on conditions and warranties, 
mistake, privity, unfair terms, remedies, and rescission for misrepresentation.  In the 
midst of this, I was also asked to ‘put a kilt’ on the treatment of contract law in a 
handbook for surveyors which had already been produced in England and which was 
now to be put on the market in Scotland.  The deadline was very tight but the sum of 
money on offer even more tempting, until I looked at the text to be Scotticised and 
realised that the task was one which would demand a little more than deletion of 
references to consideration and replacement of ‘plaintiff’ (or ‘claimant’) with ‘pursuer’.  
The work has since been carried out by other hands; but the experience certainly 
                                                 
5 See O. Lando and H. Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law Parts I and II (The Hague, 2000, 
henceforth PECL).  Part I was published in 1995 at Dordrecht. 
6 P. S. Atiyah, J. N. Adams and H. L. MacQueen, Sale of Goods, 10th edn (London, 2000). 
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reinforced a growing sense that Scots and English contract law were indeed still distinct 
bodies of doctrine. 
 
 Let me say at once that I do not approach this subject in any narrowly 
nationalistic spirit, or with any sense that it would be a Bad Thing if Scots contract law 
was merely a mirror image of its English counterpart.  There are two questions for me: 
one, how Scots law may and should develop in the future; and the other, what, if any, 
contribution can the Scottish experience make to the future of contract law generally.  
This is especially so in Europe in the light of the Lando Principles, its forerunners, such 
as the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the Unidroit Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts, and its rivals, such as those produced by the 
Gandolfi group in Italy.7  But the question is also relevant in a world thoroughly used 
by now to the idea of a global economy, which is being reinforced and deepened by 
trans-national e-business and contracting on the Internet. 
 
With regard to this point, it is worth reminding ourselves yet again of an old idea 
of comparative law with respect to ‘mixed’ legal systems, amongst which Scots law falls 
to be classified.  In 1924 Henri Lévy Ullmann observed that ‘Scots law gives us a 
picture of what will be some day the law of the civilised nations, namely a combination 
between the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental system’.8  These words were echoed 
more recently by Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, who wrote (in the translation of Tony 
Weir): ‘… it is clear that Scots law deserves particular attention from comparative lawyers 
as a special instance of the symbiosis of the English and Continental legal traditions; this 
may be of some assistance to those who embark on the great project of the future, 
namely to procure a gradual approximation of Civil Law and Common Law.’9  Such 
thinking has been extended to mixed legal systems more generally: ‘mixed systems can be 
regarded as points of reconciliation and as models of the symbiosis of legal systems. 
They may even be depicted as the ‘ideal systems’ of the future.’10  As noted by Jacques 
du Plessis, from Stellenbosch University in another mixed legal system, South Africa, ‘it 
can be argued that mixed systems have the potential of being legal ‘battlefields’ where 
rules from different systems have to fight for their survival so that only the fittest or best 
rules survive’.11 
 
But, as Esin Örücü has observed, ‘they [mixed systems] have not yet become the 
ideal systems of the future as was hoped, however’,12 and Scots law and the other mixed 
legal systems have not in fact received much attention outside Scotland and the other 
                                                 
7 The work of this group, headed by  Professor Giuseppe Gandolfi (Pavia), has now been published: Code 
Europeen des Contrats, Avant-projet, coordinateur Giuseppe Gandolfi, vol. I, (Milan, 2000). It is based upon the 
Italian Civil Code and the Contract Code for Scotland and England drafted by Harvey McGregor QC for 
the two Law Commissions in the late 1960s, for which see H. McGregor, Contract Code drawn up on behalf of 
the English Law Commission (Milan, 1993). 
8 H. Lévy-Ullmann (trans F. P. Walton), ‘The law of Scotland’, (1925) 37 JR, at 390. 
9 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, trans T. Weir, 3rd edn (Oxford, 1998), 204.  
The statement also appeared in the first and second editions. 
10 E. Örücü, E. Attwooll and S. Coyle (eds.), Studies in Legal Systems: Mixed and Mixing (The Hague, London 
and Boston, 1996), 350 (Örücü). For another recent analysis of mixed systems, see W. Tetley, ‘Mixed 
jurisdictions: Common Law vs Civil Law (codified and uncodified)’, (1999) 4(ns) Uniform Law Review 591. A 
perceptive older study is J. McKnight, ‘Some historical observations on mixed systems of law’, 1977 JR 177. 
11 J. du Plessis, ‘The promises and pitfalls of mixed legal systems: the South African and Scottish 
experiences’, (1998) 3 Stellenbosch LR, at 343. 
12 Örücü, (above n.10), 351.  
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mixed systems themselves.13  The reasons why this might be so have been well 
expressed by Du Plessis: 
 
[T]he mere fact that a system has the promise of being able to select from a 
broader variety of rules obviously does not imply that the best rule necessarily is 
going to be selected.  The pitfall is that it could be the worst rule for that matter, 
in which case one would not have a particularly exciting ‘mixed’ legal system, but 
a rather, as some would say, depressing ‘mixed up’ legal system. … Ultimately, 
there is nothing inherently admirable or exciting about a rule derived from a 
mixed legal system.  It entirely depends on what is mixed.14 
 
On the other hand, Jan Smits has written, in a lecture of 19 May 2000 inaugurating his 
tenure of the chair of European Private Law at Maastricht in the Netherlands: 
 
It is my profound belief that the experience mixed legal systems already have 
with the mixing of the civil law and the common law can be of great significance 
for the venture of establishing a European Private Law.  Many times, the 
Rechtshonoratien of these systems were able to pick from both the civil law and the 
common law what they considered to be the best solution for a specific 
problem.15  
 
In his lecture, Smits illustrates this thesis by drawing critically upon the experiences of 
Scotland, South Africa, Quebec and Louisiana in considering the ‘duty to rescue’ and the 
rewarding of the Good Samaritan as part of the new ius commune.  More recently, with 
Michael Milo of Utrecht, Smits has edited a collection on ‘Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems: 
A Challenge to Comparative Law’, the aim of which is to explore how the trust may be 
accommodated in Civil Law systems.  For this purpose, say Milo and Smits, ‘mixed legal 
systems turn out to be a Fundgrube [treasure trove]’.16  It seems to me that it is only by 
specific and detailed analyses of this kind that we can find out whether or not mixed 
systems do embody the best—or at least good or defensible—choices between the 
contrasting rules of the Common and the Civil Law, and thus have a role to play in the 
convergence of legal systems in Europe.   
 
In recent times, however, some Scots lawyers have seemed to lack faith in the 
merits of being a mixed system and to see only a future of assimilation within the 
Common Law unless appropriately Civilian remedial action is taken.  The famous 
words of the late Pierre Trudeau, comparing Canada’s relationship with the USA to 
sleeping with an elephant,17 may be applied to the connection between Scots and 
English law.  T B Smith was the first major proponent of this concern, and his views 
                                                 
13 But see H. David, Introduction a l’étude du droit écossais (Paris, 1972) and H. Weber, Einführung in das 
schottische Recht (Darmstadt, 1978). Other non-Scots to write extensively about Scots law include Klaus Luig 
(Cologne) and Peter Birks (Oxford). Christian von Bar’s The Common European Law of Torts, 2 vols, (Oxford, 
1998-2000) makes frequent reference to Scots law.  Reinhard Zimmermann (Regensburg) and a number 
of South African scholars have recently taken a comparative interest in Scots law: see K. G. C. Reid and R. 
Zimmermann (eds.), History of Private Law in Scotland (Oxford, 2000). 
14 Du Plessis, (above, n.11), at 343. 
15 J. M. Smits, The Good Samaritan in European Private Law: on the perils of principles without a programme and a 
programme for the future (Deventer, 2000), at 35.  See also ibid, 49; idem, ‘European private law as a mixed 
legal system’, (1998) 5 Maastricht Journal 328, and Europees privaatrecht in wording (Antwerp, 1999). 
16 M. Milo and J. Smits, (2000) 8(3) European Review of Private Law 421 at 426.  The other contributors to 
the collection are K. G. C. Reid and G. L. Gretton (Scotland), M. J. de Waal (South Africa) and C. H. van 
Rhee and H. L. E. Verhagen (Netherlands). 
17 E. Knowles (ed), Oxford Dictionary of Quotations 5th edn., (Oxford, 1999), 783-4. 
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emerge pretty clearly in the marvellous titles of some of his great articles:  e.g. ‘The 
Common Law Cuckoo: Problems of ‘Mixed’ Legal Systems with special reference to 
restrictive interpretations in the Scots law of obligations’; ‘Strange Gods: the crisis of 
Scots law as a civilian system’; and so on.18  Lately, the most articulate public proponent 
of this view has been my good friend Robin Evans-Jones of Aberdeen, who argues that 
the mixed character of Scots law has been the product largely of weak law encountering 
and being overwhelmed by stronger law in a series of receptions – first, the medieval 
customary structure by the Civil Law, second, the Civil Law by the Common Law – and 
that its borrowing from one system or another has been determined by this relative 
strength (essentially a cultural matter) rather than by a rational and critical process of 
choice of the best rule amongst competing alternatives.  He speaks of ‘the myth of the 
genius of Scots private law’, and illustrates his thesis from developments in the Scots law 
of unjustified enrichment (the role of error as a ground of recovery following the case of 
Morgan Guaranty19 in 1995) and property (the case of Sharp v Thomson20 in 1997, in which 
the House of Lords set on one side the principles of property law in order to produce 
what was seen as a just result in a competition between a purchaser and the holder of a 
floating charge arising on the seller’s insolvency, the floating charge being a concept 
introduced in Scotland by legislation in 1961).21   
 
There are many points in this argument upon which one might wish to dwell.  
For example, there could be elaboration of Tony Weir’s recent observation, backed up 
by a wealth of detail in many fields of law, emphasising ‘how very different, after nearly 
three centuries of political unification in an unquestionably single market, the laws of 
Scotland and England continue to be’.22  Again, one might speak of the genius of Scots 
law, not as a matter of claiming for it a higher or superior quality, but rather by way of 
identifying its ‘spirit’ or ‘characteristic disposition’, as my Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
defines the word’s primary meaning, and seeing that as indeed lying in a process of 
eclectic borrowing and adaptation of material derived from various traditions maintained 
over many centuries and still going on.23  Further, one might note that the two areas of 
                                                 
18 The articles mentioned can be most conveniently consulted in his Studies Critical and Comparative 
(Edinburgh, 1962).  Cuckoos seem self-explanatory, but a godless age may need to be reminded of 
Genesis, 34, 2 (Authorised Version): ‘Put away the strange gods that are among you, and be clean, and 
change your garments.’ Smith also wrote of the law of Scotland ‘awhoring after some very strange gods’ 
(Studies, 72; also his Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1962), 616); this conflates the 
Genesis reference just given with Exodus 34, 15-16. 
19 Morgan Guaranty v Lothian Regional Council 1995 SC 151. 
20 1997 SC (HL) 66. 
21 See R. Evans-Jones, ‘Receptions of law, mixed legal systems and the myth of the genius of Scots private 
law’, (1998) 114 LQR 228. For other sceptical views of the ‘genius’ and commitment to coherence and 
principle of Scots law, see, inter alia, A. Rodger, ‘Thinking about Scots law’, (1996) 1 Edin LR 3; L. Farmer, 
Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order: Crime and the Genius of Scots Law 1747 to the Present (Cambridge, 1997); 
J. M. Thomson, ‘Legal change and Scots private law’, in J. Cairns and O. Robinson (eds.), Critical Studies in 
Ancient Law. Comparative Law and Legal History: Essays in Honour of Alan Watson (Oxford, 2001), 379-91. 
Thomson discusses the case of Morgan Guaranty at 387-9, noting correctly that English developments were a 
necessary part of the background to the case, and also that the court disguised the appearance of change in 
the law by talking of a return to the older, Civilian principles of the law. But this latter point sits uneasily 
with his general view that the development of private law is not guided by concepts of principle or 
doctrinal purity. Finally, it should also be noted that Evans-Jones has argued that the search for ‘British’ law 
in the House of Lords has sometimes meant the deployment of Scots rather than English law: ‘Roman law 
in Scotland and England and the development of one law for Britain’, (1999) 115 LQR 605. 
22 T. Weir, ‘Divergent legal systems in a single Member State’, (1998) 6 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 
564 at 565. 
23 Further on this, see Thomson (n. 21 above), although the material discussed further below in the present 
paper will show that I do not agree with his observation (at 379) that ‘even recent changes in Scots private 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2013/41 
 
Page 6 of 16 
 
law which Evans-Jones discusses, enrichment and property, are perhaps those parts of 
private law in which Common Law influences are in general least apparent, with 
developments since Morgan and Sharp rather suggesting a refusal to allow further room 
for expansion for any Common Law disposition which they may contain.  Thus in 
enrichment law the courts have affirmed in some important decisions that the basic, 
essentially Civilian, principle is that enrichments not supported by any legal ground must 
be reversed;24 while, with one notable exception in Aberdeen sheriff court now subject 
to appeal,25 Sharp v Thomson is fast becoming rather like Junior Books v Veitchi, a very 
distinguished case with no followers.26  It is also under review by the Scottish Law 
Commission.27  
 
But here I want to consider rather the issue of whether or not a mixed system 
can engage upon a rational and critical process of choice between competing alternatives, 
or whether the process of mixing inevitably involves the dilution of one element in the 
mix by the other.  I think contract law offers the ideal field of study here by comparison 
with the other parts of Scots private law.  As I have already mentioned, enrichment and 
property are notably Civilian in character, while delict (tort), or at any rate its central 
topic of negligence, is now pretty thoroughly indistinguishable from its English 
counterpart (although that also owes something to the ‘Civilianisation’ of English law in 
this area28).  Contract, on the other hand, is much more mixed, and the mixing is still 
going on; so it is here that we can study the process and its outcomes most closely.  To 
this end we can now use two major tools: first, we can compare the outcomes of Scots 
law with the Lando Principles, which do indeed represent a critical and rational choice 
across many traditions of the ‘best rule’ in contract; and second we can draw upon the 
outcomes of the historical research which has just been published in two volumes under 
the rather mundane title, History of Private Law in Scotland,29 but which to those who were 
the contributors will always be known as Northern Cross,30 in tongue-in-cheek homage to 
                                                                                                                                            
law were neither a rational development from pre-existing legal doctrine nor a response to general socio-
economic evolution’. 
24 See in particular Shilliday v Smith 1998 SC 725; Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd 1998 SC 
(HL) 90 per Lord Hope of Craighead at 98; commented upon by P. Hood, ‘Unjustified enrichment in Scots 
law: a further step towards rationalisation’, (1998) 114 LQR 559; M. A. Hogg, ‘Contract, agency and 
recompense: four recent enrichment cases’, (1998) 2 Edin LR 357; P. Hellwege, ‘Rationalising the Scottish 
law of unjustified enrichment’, (2000) 11 Stellenbosch LR 50; and W. D. H. Sellar, ‘Shilliday v Smith: unjust 
enrichment through the looking glass?’, (2001) 5 Edin LR 80.  See also the speech of Lord Hope of 
Craighead in Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349.  In the light of the decisions 
mentioned, the Scottish Law Commission has taken the view that no statutory intervention is necessary and 
the development of the law can be left to the courts: Report on Unjustified Enrichment, Error of Law and 
Public Authority Receipts and Disbursements (Scot. Law Com. No 169: 1999). 
25 Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 116; commented upon by R. Rennie, ‘To Sharp v Thomson – 
an heir’, 2000 SLT (News) 239; S. C. Styles, ‘Sharp pains for Scots property law’, 2000 SLT (News) 305; G. 
L. Gretton, ‘Equitable ownership in Scots law?’, (2001) 5 Edin LR 73. 
26 See e.g. Lady Fforde v McKinnon 1998 SLT 902 at 909 per LJC Cullen; Fleming’s Tr v Fleming 2000 SC 206 at 
215 per Lord Caplan; Gretton, ‘Equitable ownership’, at 77-8. 
27 See Scottish Law Commission Thirty-Fifth Annual Report 2000 (Scot. Law Com. No. 182: 2001), paras. 
2.37, 2.48, 3.33-35.  The Commission is acting upon a reference from the Scottish Ministers. 
28 See generally D. Ibbetson, ‘”The law of business Rome”: foundations of the Anglo-American tort of 
negligence’, (1999) 52 CLP 74; and the same author’s A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations 
(Oxford, 1999), ch. 9. 
29 See above, n. 13. 
30 My own preferred title for the work, Fiery Cross, recalling the traditional symbol with which the Highland 
clans were called out to war, was rejected by the politically correct as a result of its alternative associations 
with the Ku Klux Klan in the southern USA. Other rejected titles included Northern Lights (a problem over 
associations with the sentimental song ‘Northern Lights of Old Aberdeen’), Aurora Borealis, Northern Star, 
and St Andrews Cross. 
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the work on South African law which inspired the Scottish effort, Southern Cross.31  This 
enables us to see in much greater detail than hitherto the stages in the mixing process 
across a wide range of contract law. 
 
I have already published a comparison of some features of Scots contract law and 
the Lando Principles.32  What I tried to show in that paper was that in many instances 
where the Lando Principles had opted for either a Common Law or a Civilian approach, 
the end result was broadly similar to that achieved in Scots – and indeed South African - 
law.33  Thus, on the Civilian side, neither the Lando Principles nor Scots law favoured 
consideration or any other equivalent badge of enforceability marking out contracts from 
other agreements.  As a result, gratuitous unilateral promises were enforceable, and firm 
offers irrevocable in both systems.  Scots law and the Lando Principles both recognise 
third party rights in contract,34 while contracting parties have a right, subject to defined 
exceptions, to demand actual performance from the other side.  The converse of this in 
both systems is that if one party is not performing in accordance with the contract, the 
other has the right to withhold its side of the bargain until the non-performance is 
rectified.  Overall, what was emphasised here was the legal effect to be given to parties’ 
intentions and the right to performance as agreed or promised. 
 
Turning to the Common Law side of the Lando Principles and the Scots law of 
contract, I drew attention to other rules on breach, in particular the unified concept of 
breach as non-performance of all kinds, the acceptance of the concept of repudiation, 
and the availability of ‘self-help’ remedies of termination, available without prior judicial 
authorisation.  I noted also the recognition of the undisclosed principal in agency cases.  
Here the striking point was the emphasis on commercial utility and rules which would 
allow rapid decision-making in the market place without the time-consuming need to 
resort to the courts for a determination of the position.  A further example which I did 
not discuss in any detail was the reception into Scots law in the nineteenth century of a 
concept of undue influence, paralleled in the Lando Principles by a concept of excessive 
benefit or unfair advantage, which becomes a ground of avoidance for a party who was 
dependent on or had a relationship of trust with the other party and this other party, who 
knew or ought to have known of this, took advantage in a grossly unfair way or took an 
excessive benefit.35  
 
The copious minutes of the Lando Commission will tell future legal historians 
something of the reasons for the choices and decisions just outlined in the two previous 
paragraphs.  What if any light does historical investigation throw upon the way the 
Scots law of contract reached its current position?  Northern Cross does not tell us all the 
answers, although it is frequently very suggestive as to the direction which further 
research might take.  A very broad picture would be that the foundational influence 
upon the Scottish law of contract was the medieval canon law – hence perhaps the 
emphasis upon performance as the moral right and duty flowing from promises and 
agreements – and that this was closely woven together with the Civil Law and Civilian, in 
                                                 
31 R. Zimmermann and D. P. Visser (eds.), Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa 
(Kenwyn, 1996). 
32 Scots Law and the Road to the New Ius Commune (Ius Commune Lectures in European Private Law No 1, 
Universities of Maastricht, Utrecht, Leuven and Amsterdam, February 2000). 
33 Further on Scots and South African law, see R. Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European 
Law: The Civilian Tradition Today (Oxford, 2001), 126-58; idem, ‘Common law und ius commune: 
Unkodifizierte Mischrechtsordnungen im Vergleich’, Festschrift Hamburg Max-Planck Institute, forthcoming. 
34 As of course English law now does also, following the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. 
35 PECL, art. 4:109. 
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particular Natural Law, scholarship.  It was against this backcloth that in the 
seventeenth century Lord President Stair wrote his seminal Institutions of the Law of 
Scotland, laying out a basic scheme of the law of obligations which still lies at the heart of 
the way most Scots lawyers think about the subject.  The influence of English law 
begins to become apparent in legal writing around the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, driven chiefly by developments in commercial law, and reaches its apogee 
towards the end of the century.  The apparent decline in references to Civilian sources, 
however, masks the continuity of doctrines which were now principally vouched by 
Scottish cases and writings – the Roman-Scotch law, as Cairns and Zimmermann have 
dubbed it36 – and the same has often become true of doctrines originally borrowed from 
England – perhaps Anglo-Scotch law?  Moreover, the transplants, whether from 
Civilian or Common Law sources, have often taken on ‘the protective colouring of a 
thoroughly native species’37 as the result of adaptation to the perceived requirements of 
justice in individual cases or straightforward misunderstanding of the original doctrine.  
The whole has been welded into shape from time to time by the writers of texts, whose 
visions have sometimes competed with each other and been more or less successful in 
the courts and with practitioners.  The second half of the twentieth century saw a great 
growth in the quality and quantity of such writing, and development was further driven 
by the activities of the Scottish Law Commission, to be measured not just by the 
legislation resulting from its reports, but also by their use by lawyers as sources in their 
own right. 
 
Moving from the general to the specific, there are a number of areas in which 
there is no sign at all of a shift from a basically Civilian to a Common Law position.  
The most fundamental non-shift is the absence of any reception of either consideration 
or privity, where the basic principles set out in Stair’s Institutions remained at the root of 
the law.  This becomes more interesting in the light of what happened in nineteenth-
century South Africa, where the Roman-Dutch law flirted for a long time with a 
requirement of consideration before it was finally rejected in 1919.38  The issue arose in 
South Africa because Roman-Dutch law had used the Civilian doctrine of causa as the 
means of distinguishing enforceable from unenforceable agreements, and some lawyers 
argued that this was simply consideration under another name.  In Scotland, however, 
as Gerhard Lubbe and David Sellar point out in Northern Cross,39 Stair, influenced by the 
canon law, the Spanish scholastics and Grotius, rejected the view ‘that promises, or 
naked pactions, where there is no equivalent cause onerous intervening, do morally 
produce no obligation or action, though in congruity and decency it be fit to perform’.40  
For Stair, ‘every paction produceth action’41 – a tongue-twister translation of the 
canonist maxim, pacta servanda sunt – and the limit upon enforceability was to be found in 
the parties’ ‘purpose to oblige’,42 i.e. what today we call, rather unhappily, intention to 
                                                 
36 See J. W. Cairns, ‘The Civil Law tradition in Scottish legal thought’, in D. L. Carey Miller and R. 
Zimmermann (eds.), The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law: Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays (Berlin, 1997), 211 
n.127; R. Zimmermann and J. A. Dieckmann, ‘Das schottische Privatrecht im Spiegel seiner Literatur’, 
(1995) 3 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 899, at 899 and 909; Cairns, ‘Historical introduction’, in Reid 
and Zimmermann (eds.) (above, n.13), 163-8 (see also the editors’ preface at 6); Zimmermann, (above 
n.33), 1, 152. 
37 G. W. S. Barrow, The Kingdom of the Scots (London, 1973), 122. 
38 Conradie v Roussow 1919 AD 279.  For the twists and turns of the story see D. Hutchison, ‘Contract 
formation’, in Zimmermann and Visser (above, n.26), 166-73. 
39 In respectively, ‘Formation of contract’, in Reid and Zimmermann (eds.) (above, n. 13), vol. 2, 1 ff., at 
11-18, and ‘Promise’, ibid, 252 ff. See also Zimmermann (above, n.33), 155-8. 
40 I, 10, 10. 
41 I, 10, 7. 
42 I, 10, 13. 
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create legal relations, or in some cases, including gratuitous promises, in requirements of 
form.  Stair’s view, it may be noted, was no mere blind acceptance of those of others: 
he reached a conclusion upon a controverted point and argued out what he thought was 
the position of Scots law on the issue. 
 
My own Northern Cross study of third party rights in contract likewise does not 
suggest any serious attempt in the centuries after Stair to move away from his doctrine of 
jus quaesitum tertio in favour of privity, even after the latter doctrine had begun to 
crystallise in English law in the middle of the nineteenth century.43  Once again, Stair 
reached his position through an argument or debate about the natural law, in particular 
rejecting the views of Grotius, and holding that the views of the Spanish scholastic 
Molina corresponded better with the Scottish authorities on the subject.  The 
difficulties which Scots law subsequently had with the jus quaesitum tertio arose from 
reconciling Stair’s doctrine with another line of authority which he had treated narrowly 
elsewhere in the Institutions but which was much more broadly developed by later writers 
and in case law.  These difficulties were ultimately, if awkwardly, reconciled in 1898 by a 
text writer, Condie Sandeman, whose analysis was more or less gratefully adopted by 
Lord Dunedin when they were at last focused in an actual case, Carmichael v Carmichael’s 
Executrix,44 in the House of Lords in 1920.  The technical result was apparently to 
hamstring the scope of the jus quaesitum tertio, but this did not occur out of any desire to 
introduce a doctrine of privity from English law.  True, Condie Sandeman approached 
jus quaesitum tertio as ‘a deviation from the rule of contract law, that no third party can sue 
upon a contract’, not exactly the spirit of Stair; but he was clear that ‘the law of 
Scotland … is well settled … [and is] that every stipulation in a mutual agreement is 
binding upon the person obliged, whether it is conceded in favour of the other 
contractor or of a third party’.  He comforted himself for this deviation through the 
wholly unhistorical proposition that ‘our tertius with his jus quaesitum and the English 
cestui que trust show strong affinity’.45  As for Lord Dunedin, he made his dislike of 
privity (and consideration) characteristically plain in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v 
Selfridge & Co Ltd46 in 1915:47 
 
My Lords, I confess that this case is to my mind apt to nip any budding affection 
which one might have had for the doctrine of consideration.  For the effect of 
that doctrine in the present case is to make it possible for a person to snap his 
fingers at a bargain deliberately made, a bargain not in itself unfair, and which the 
person seeking to enforce it has a legitimate interest to enforce. 
 
And although in Carmichael he was driven to surround the jus quaesitum tertio with some 
very technical and difficult rules which have caused problems ever since, it has perhaps 
not been sufficiently emphasised how liberal and flexible was his application of those 
technicalities in the case, so that the actual result was in favour of the third party right. 
 
 What these examples would suggest to me is that, in at least these two instances, 
the Civilian base of Scots contract law has proved entirely durable despite centuries of 
exposure to the dark forces of the Common Law.  The difficulties encountered en route 
                                                 
43 For what follows, see ‘Third party rights in contract: jus quaesitum tertio’, in Reid and Zimmermann (eds.) 
(above, n. 13), vol. 2, 220 ff. 
44 1920 SC (HL) 195. 
45 For the quotations from Sandeman, see MacQueen (above, n. 43), 236-7. 
46 [1915] AC 847. 
47 At 855. 
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have been largely of our own making, and have had little to do with any desire to be 
assimilated with English law.  The rational strength of the basic Scottish position, 
founded on giving effect to the intention of the parties, has enabled it to withstand any 
earth tremors there may have been: the institutional writers, Erskine and Bell, speaking 
of valuable or adequate consideration in their definitions of contract,48 for example, or 
Lord Kames’ view that there was no general principle of jus quaesitum tertio, only a limited 
number of exceptional cases in which the third party acquired a right.49 
 
If we now switch to those areas in which the Common Law position was 
received into, or at any rate was influential in the development of Scots law, perhaps the 
most striking instance is the growth of the self-help remedy of termination for breach of 
contract.  Under the Lando Principles, we may note, ‘a party may terminate the contract 
if the other party’s non-performance is fundamental’, whereas ‘a general right of 
cancellation was never recognized in Roman law’.50  David Johnston’s study in Northern 
Cross demonstrates the Civilian base of the treatment of the subject in Stair and the other 
institutional writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.51  The analysis treated 
delay (mora) as the most important form of breach, with other forms of non-performance 
being treated generally, with the typical remedies being orders for performance, save 
where that was impossible, or damages and interest.  The doctrine of mutuality, almost 
certainly derived from the Civilian exceptio non adimpleti contractus, enabled one confronted 
with non-performance on the other side, to decline to perform its own part of the 
contract. By 1800, however, presumably under English influence, breach was dealt with 
in a more general way, and the question of whether a party might cease performance 
altogether, with permanent effect, began to arise.  The rules on sale allowed a buyer to 
reject defective goods (the Civilian actio redhibitoria), but otherwise the right to terminate 
appeared to depend upon there being an appropriate clause in the contract (a lex 
commissoria), the classic example being an irritancy clause in a lease.  But a declarator had 
to be obtained in such cases.   
 
What came to be seen as the key case laying down the law that a party could 
terminate without declarator following the other party’s material breach was Turnbull v 
McLean & Co52 in 1874, although there had been forerunners pointing in this direction 
since the 1850s.  English influence was certainly strong in this case:53 a number of 
English cases were cited in argument and Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff said that ‘from 
any study that I have been able to give to the English cases I do not think they indicate 
any material difference in principle from our own rules on this subject’.54  But the actual 
decision built from the long-established principle of mutuality – a party in breach cannot 
                                                 
48 Erskine, Inst., III, 1, 16 (‘A contract is a voluntary agreement of two or more persons by which 
something is to be given or performed upon one part for a valuable consideration, either present or future, 
on the other part’); Bell, Prin., § 66 (‘It is a rule, that every obligation is presumed to be for an adequate 
consideration’). 
49 See MacQueen (above, n. 43), 228-30. 
50 PECL, art. 9:301(1); Zimmermann (above, n. 33), 141. 
51 D. Johnston, ‘Breach of contract’, in Reid and Zimmermann (eds.) (above, n. 13), vol. 2, 175 ff. See also 
H. L. MacQueen, ‘Remedies for breach of contract: the future development of Scots law in its European 
and international context’, (1997) 1 Edin LR 200 at 202-12; W. W. McBryde, ‘The Scots law of breach of 
contract: a mixed system in operation’, (2001) 5 Edin LR, forthcoming. 
52 (1874) 1 R 730 at 738, per LJC Moncreiff (‘where one party has refused or failed to perform his part of 
the contract in any material respect the other is entitled either to insist for implement, claiming damages for 
the breach, or to rescind the contract altogether, except so far as it has been performed.’) 
53 Zimmermann (above n.33), 142-3, raises the possibility that the English development was influenced by 
the ius commune and the concept of conditions. 
54 Ibid, at 738. 
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compel the other to perform – and practical considerations arising from the fact that the 
contract in question was an instalment one: for how long was a party confronted with 
non-performance to be treated as still bound to perform its own side of the bargain? 
 
It is therefore not clear to me how far the court in Turnbull was conscious of 
innovation and a move in a more English direction.  The doctrine of materiality as 
enunciated in Turnbull developed in several subsequent cases before appearing to take on 
a slightly different form, first in the special statutory provisions on the buyer’s right of 
rejection in Scotland in the Sale of Goods Act 1893,55 laying down that the buyer could 
only reject upon breach of a material term (i.e. pointing much more strongly towards a 
condition/warranty dichotomy), and then in the judgment of Lord President Dunedin in 
Wade v Waldon56 in 1909, saying that termination could only follow upon breach of a 
term that was material in the sense that it went to the root of the contract.  Any 
tendency which the 1893 Act and Wade showed towards doctrine akin to conditions and 
warranties was, however, held in check, and in its current form, as revised in 1994,57 the 
right to reject under the Sale of Goods Act is founded upon the seller’s material breach 
rather than upon breach of a material term.  This followed work by the Scottish Law 
Commission,58 which more recently also surveyed remedies for breach more generally, 
and on consultation found no strong support for any change in the law on material 
breach and termination, which appears to work in practice and to be reasonably well 
understood.59  So what we see here is an area of contract law in which a Civilian model 
was modified in favour of a Common Law one; but the English law was not received in 
detail and instead there emerged, by way of the interplay between the courts and the text 
writers, a good example of Anglo-Scotch law, systematic and workable in its own right, 
and very similar to the Lando Principles in its basic formulation.  
 
A more overt anglicisation and rejection of Civilian principle was the reception of 
the postal acceptance rule.  The first major case was Dunlop v Higgins in 1847-48,60 
where the Court of Session and the House of Lords both chose to follow the famous 
case of Adams v Lindsell.61  Dunlop was a case of late delivery of the acceptance, and in 
some ways the key question was not so much when the contract was concluded as for 
how long the offer should be held open for acceptance.  But Thomson v James,62 decided 
by the Court of Session in 1855, was a case where the offeror posted a withdrawal on the 
same day that the acceptance was likewise committed to the post.  The question as to 
whether or not there was a contract therefore depended fundamentally upon the effect 
of postal communications between distant parties.  Counsel for the offeror based their 
arguments upon classical or ‘strict’ Civilian principles of consensus, saying that at no time 
were the parties ever actually agreed, while the offeree’s case rested upon principles of 
equity and justice as represented by the case of Adams: he was entitled to act, or rely, 
upon the offer which he did not know to have been retracted.  By a majority, the court 
held for the offeree and adopted the postal acceptance rule, on the bases that Civilian 
writers and Stair had not contemplated the problems of contracting at a distance and an 
                                                 
55 See s. 11(2) of the 1893 Act. 
56 1909 SC 571. 
57 By the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994. 
58 Report on Sale and Supply of Goods (Scot Law Com No 104, 1987). 
59 Report on Remedies for Breach of Contract (Scot Law Com No 174, 1999), paras.7.5-24. 
60 (1847) 9 D 1407; (1848) 6 Bell’s App 195 (HL). 
61 (1818) 1 B & Ald 681. 
62 (1855) 18 D 1.  Note also the brief report at 17 D 1146, narrating that the ‘extreme length and 
importance of this case’ have led to the full report being held over to the next volume, since judicial 
revision of the text has not been completed. 
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acceptor could do no more than commit his communication to the post.  The case was 
clearly seen by contemporaries as a major issue of principle, and both arguments and 
judicial opinions are exceptionally lengthy by the standards of the time.  It cannot be 
seen as a meek capitulation of the Civil to the Common Law; rather, it represents a 
carefully considered solution to a relatively new and fundamental problem arising from 
changing commercial conditions.63  Inasmuch as it protects the offeree from the 
uncommunicated revocation of the offer, it reaches exactly the same solution as the 
Lando Principles (and indeed the Vienna Convention and the Unidroit Principles);64 and 
it is noteworthy that Lord President McNeill let fall one of many Scottish dicta against 
the proposition that the acceptance lost in the post concludes a contract.65 
 
My last example of the nineteenth-century reception of English law is the arrival 
of undue influence in Gray v Binny66 in 1879.  A soldier son succeeded in having the 
court strike down his agreement to disentail his inheritance in favour of his mother and, 
ultimately, of the solicitor who was advising them both but was also the mother’s 
creditor.  The mother and the solicitor argued that Scots law did not recognise undue 
influence unless it was also within the well-established (and Civilian) category of fraud; 
while the son, whose claim that he acted out of love for and dependence upon his 
mother as well as his own ignorance, never averred fraud by her or the solicitor.  An 
abundance of English and some Scottish cases were cited in the debate.  Lord Shand 
was the most explicit of the judges on the need to develop some doctrine to deal with 
such cases that fell short of fraud; the law would be lamentably defective if it provided 
no remedy in this kind of case.  While the principles involved had received more 
consideration in England, they were ‘based on reason and justice, and indeed it has been 
said on public policy, and are of universal application’.67  Again, therefore, the position 
was fully argued, and a decision consciously made, based upon a perceived gap in the law 
and an inability to deal with a genuine problem in any other way.  And it is notable that 
in the subsequent development of undue influence in Scotland, many features of the 
equitable English doctrine – for example, presumptions of undue influence – were not 
taken up.68 
 
 So much for the nineteenth-century reception of English contract law in 
Scotland.  I think that I have said enough to indicate my view that, whether brought 
about by the House of Lords or, more typically, by the Scottish courts and writers 
themselves, it was not always uncritical or total, and that the doctrines which emerged, 
whatever one might think of them, were by and large native reworkings of the original 
source material, often linked to a Scottish principle and generally aimed at simplicity and 
practicality; but nonetheless capable of such systematic exposition as would allow their 
future operation to be as predictable and regular as any other legal system. 
 
                                                 
63 On the development of postal services in Scotland, see A. R. B. Haldane, Three Centuries of Scottish Posts 
(Edinburgh, 1971). 
64 PECL, art. 2:202(1). See also Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods, art. 16, and 
UNIDROIT, Principles of International Commercial Contracts (Rome, 1994), art. 2.4. See also the South African 
case adopting the postal rule, Cape Explosives Works Ltd v South African Oil and Fat Industries Ltd 1921 CPD 
244. 
65 (1855) 18 D at 12.  See further W. W. McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1987), 84. 
66 (1879) 7 R 332. Compare the development of undue influence in South Africa, for which see 
Zimmermann (above n. 33), 136-8. 
67 At 349. 
68 On the modern law of undue influence in Scotland, see McBryde, (above, n. 62), 244-9. 
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 What is the position now as the twentieth century becomes the twenty-first?  So 
far as the courts and text writers are concerned, I can perhaps best illustrate the 
continuing eclecticism – or genius - of our law with two bodies of case law which are 
currently attracting a great deal of attention.   
 
The first concerns the remedy of specific implement (equivalent to specific 
performance in English law).  The law of specific implement, although resting upon a 
Civilian base, has long been subject to Common Law influence, in that since the late 
nineteenth century it has been subject to the equitable discretion of the court and the 
rules of English law as to when specific performance will be refused have been received 
as guidelines as to when the Scottish courts’ discretion should be exercised to refuse the 
remedy.  The key difference between Scots and English law remains, however, that 
specific implement is a right, albeit qualified, whereas specific performance is available 
only if that is a more appropriate remedy than damages.69  That there is more in this 
distinction than may appear at first blush has emerged in recent cases on both sides of 
the border about so-called ‘keep open’ clauses in commercial leases, obliging the tenant 
to carry on in a particular business at the leased premises.  In England, the House of 
Lords has pronounced that such clauses are generally not specifically enforceable.70  
Before this decision, however, an Extra Division of the Court of Session had granted a 
landlord specific implement against a tenant which wanted to abandon the lease.71  The 
contrasting results led to debate as to the position in Scotland, which has been resolved, 
for the time being at least, in favour of the landlord in the specific case, and in favour of 
a relatively strong right to specific enforcement.  In Highland and Universal Properties Ltd v 
Safeway Properties Ltd72 the First Division drew a contrast between the Scottish and 
English concepts of specific enforcement as the main reason for not applying the views 
of the House of Lords.  The two main opinions, those of Lord President Rodger and 
Lord Kingarth, did not rest simply on the grounds of conceptual difference, but 
addressed head-on some of the arguments against specific enforcement in the English 
case.  Thus Lord President Rodger observed: ‘I merely record that experience of 
decrees of this kind in Scotland in recent years does not suggest that defenders have in 
practice had difficulty in obtempering them.  Nor have these decrees led in Scotland to 
the kind of heavy and expensive litigation which the House of Lords feared would follow 
in England.’73  Lord Kingarth did not think that ‘the history in Scotland’ had ‘given rise 
to any obvious difficulties in enforcement or supervision’.74  Meanwhile, the general 
rules of specific implement had been under review by the Scottish Law Commission, 
which reported at Christmas 1999: ‘Our preliminary view was that the existing law was 
satisfactory.  Consultees agreed.  We think that no reforming legislation is necessary.’75 
 
In the Safeways case Lord Kingarth commented, without apparent concern, that 
‘there may be differences, as between Scotland and England, in relation to the 
enforcement of provisions in commercial contracts which depend upon different but 
                                                 
69 See A. D. Smith, ‘Specific implement’, in Reid and Zimmermann (eds.) (above, n. 13), vol. 2, 195 ff. 
70 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1998] AC 1. 
71 Retail Parks Investments Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland (No 2) 1996 SC 227.  See for comment on this and 
the Co-operative Insurance case H. L. MacQueen and L. J. Macgregor, ‘Specific implement, interdict and 
contractual performance’, (1999) 3 Edin LR 239. 
72 2000 SC 297; commented upon by A. D. Smith, ‘Keep on keeping open’, (2000) 4 Edin LR 336.  There 
will be no further proceedings in the case, as the parties settled after Safeways found new tenants to occupy 
the space in its place: see ‘Superstore packs its bags at last’, Edinburgh Evening News, 7 November 2000.  
73 2000 SC at 302H. 
74 2000 SC at 313D-E. 
75 Scot. Law Com. No. 174, para 7.28. 
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well established principles’.76  This may appear to contrast with the second case with 
which I seek to illustrate the relationship between Scots and English contract law, Smith v 
Bank of Scotland.77 In this case the House of Lords over-ruled the Court of Session and 
applied its earlier decision in the English appeal, Barclays Bank v O’Brien.78 A desire that 
the law in matters affecting banks and guarantees given them by the spouses of debtor-
customers should be the same in Scotland as in England clearly underlay the decision.  
Lord Jauncey, who ‘applying the principles of Scots law alone … would have been 
disposed to dismiss this appeal’, in the end concurred: ‘I appreciate the practical 
advantages of applying the same law to identical transactions in both jurisdictions’.79  
Lord Clyde argued that before O’Brien the Scots law on guarantees had developed on 
broadly the same lines as the English law, and that the policy considerations were 
identical in both jurisdictions.  He concluded:80 
 
I am not persuaded that there are any social or economic considerations which 
would justify a difference in the law between the two jurisdictions in the 
particular point here under consideration.  Indeed when similar transactions 
with similar institutions or indeed branches of the same institutions may be 
taking place in both countries there is a clear practical advantage in the 
preservation of corresponding legal provisions.  Furthermore, the development 
which is here proposed is one which is of clear advantage and usefulness to those 
who may be prompted to join with a spouse or other close companion in the 
granting of a security over their home or other property with grave disadvantage 
to themselves, which they may not even fully appreciate, and with a particular 
benefit to the business interests of the companion. 
 
Here, then, we have a clear judicial alignment of Scots with English law.  But it is only 
fair to note that the move is supported by policy considerations that were evidently 
argued and reflected upon before the decision was reached.  It is not a case of a weak 
law lying down before a strong.  Further, the nineteenth-century cases which founded 
the pre-O’Brien position in Scotland – Hamilton v Watson,81 Young v Clydesdale Bank 82and 
Royal Bank of Scotland v Greenshields 83– had themselves been criticised.84  Moreover, the 
                                                 
76 2000 SC at 314B. 
77 1997 SC (HL) 111.  There are numerous, mostly critical, commentaries on the case: see e.g. two articles 
by G. L. Gretton, both entitled ‘Sexually transmitted debt’: 1997 SLT (News) 195; 1999 Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 419; also J. M. Thomson, ‘Misplaced concern?’, (1997) 65 SLG 124; L. J. Macgregor, ‘The 
House of Lords ‘applies’ O’Brien north of the border’, (1998) 2 Edin LR 90. See also A. D. M. Forte (ed), 
Good Faith in Contract and Property (Oxford, 1999), in particular the editor’s own contribution (more 
favourable to the case). For the so-far cautious approach of the Scottish courts to the new law, see 
Braithwaite v Bank of Scotland 1999 SLT 25; Forsyth v Royal Bank of Scotland plc 2000 SLT 1295; Wright v Cotias 
Investments Inc 2001 SLT 353; and Ahmed v Clydesdale Bank plc 2001 SLT 423. 
78 [1994] 1 AC 180. 
79 1997 SC (HL) at 115F-G. 
80 1997 SC (HL) at 120E-G. 
81 (1842) 5 D 280; aff’d (1845) 4 Bell’s App 67 (HL). 
82 (1889) 17 R 231. 
83 1914 SC 259. 
84 See J. J. Gow, The Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1964), 310-12. Further, so far as 
concerned private individuals’ guarantees, the old law was inconsistent with what had become accepted by 
the banks themselves as good practice: see Forte (above, n.74), at 91 n.64. The inconsistency of the former 
law with the Roman senatus consultum Velleianum and the authentica si qua mulier (for which see R. 
Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (pbk. edn., Oxford, 1996), 
145-52) was never a ground for its criticism in Scotland, however. 
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development in O’Brien can be paralleled in Germany,85 and would be supported by the 
Lando Principles.86   
 
Perhaps most importantly, Lord Clyde went out of his way to find a distinct 
doctrinal basis for O’Brien in Scotland, constructive notice being a concept of limited 
scope in Scots law.  He found it in ‘the broad principle in the field of contract law of 
fair dealing in good faith’.87  Consciously or not, he thus brought into the arena a 
principle that on the whole English law has denied, while it flourishes in Continental 
systems.  In Scotland, while the principle had never been subject to the vigorous judicial 
and academic put-downs which it has long had in England, it had scarcely been a very 
conspicuous part of contract law before 1997.  Debate has since begun upon the wider 
implications of Lord Clyde’s dictum for the law of contract, with predictably inconclusive 
results to date;88 but should the time come for the courts to consider whether the 
principle is any more than latent within existing rules, or can be used more creatively in 
the development of the law, the decision between these possibilities ought at least to be 
an informed and justifiable one.   
 
In devolved Scotland, the fate of private law is now no longer a matter 
predominantly for the courts and text writers.  It was a legitimate Scottish complaint 
before 1999 that legislation on private law matters would only get through Parliament 
provided that there was no worthwhile debate about it, and that even then matters 
moved slowly at best.  While viewed over the long run the Scottish Law Commission 
had a good record of having its reports implemented legislatively, there were often long 
intervals between report and royal assent.  At the very least the Scottish Parliament 
provides the means for more rapid implementation.  While private law is unlikely to be 
a major priority for MSPs, a start has been made and there are a number of Law 
Commission reports awaiting attention.  So far as contract law is concerned, there are 
proposals relating to the formation and interpretation of contracts, the admissibility of 
extrinsic evidence in connection with interpretation, the subjection of penal clauses to a 
judicial control for manifest excessiveness, and the reform of certain aspects of remedies 
for breach of contract, in particular the rule in White & Carter (Councils) v McGregor.89  In 
all these reports there has been extensive discussion of comparative law, including the 
Lando Principles, and the recommendations point more firmly in the directions of the 
Continental and the Lando solutions than those of the Common Law.  If the Scottish 
Parliament acts upon these reports, the Civilian dimension of Scots contract law will be 
strengthened, and that on the basis of rational argument about what is the best solution 
in each of the areas discussed. 
 
                                                 
85 BverfGE 89, 214-236 (= NJW, 47 (1994) 36-39). See further M. Habersack and R. Zimmermann, ‘Legal 
change in a codified system: recent developments in German suretyship law’, (1999) 3 Edin LR 272. Note 
also the Dutch, Italian and Belgian commentaries on the case in (1996) 4(3) European Review of Private Law 
263-285. 
86 See PECL, art. 4:111 and Comment, Illustration 2. 
87 1997 SC (HL) at 121B-C. 
88 See the collection edited by Forte (above, n. 74).  My contribution (at 5 ff.) argues that a principle of 
good faith explains and rationalises the seemingly disparate cases upon pre-contractual liability.  Good 
faith is of course a key element of the Lando Principles: see PECL, art. 1:201. The Scottish Law 
Commission found little support for good faith as an explicit control mechanism upon the remedy of 
retention (suspension of performance): Scot. Law Com. No 174, para 7.18. 
89 See Report on Formation of Contract: Scottish Law and the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (Scot. Law Com. No. 144, 1993); Report on Interpretation in Private 
Law (Scot. Law Com. No. 160, 1997); Report on Penalty Clauses (Scot. Law Com. No 171, 1999); Report 
on Remedies for Breach of Contract (Scot. Law Com. No. 174, 1999). 
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I conclude, therefore, that the Scots law of contract exemplifies what can be 
achieved in a mixed system of law, that this achievement is not accidental but is rather 
the product of a long-sustained and continuing inter-action between the courts, the text-
writers and, increasingly, the legislators and those who prepare what they enact.90  I am 
confident that Scots law has something distinctive to contribute to debates about 
contract law in its European and global future, and indeed to similar debates about other 
parts of private law, some of which I have mentioned in the course of this lecture.  It is 
certainly too optimistic to say, with Lévy-Ullmann, that Scots law gives us a picture of 
what will some day be the law of the civilised nations; but I am not ashamed to claim 
that it merits more comparative study. 
 
  
                                                 
90 It also raises questions, in my opinion, against the arguments put forward by, e.g. Legrand and Teubner, 
about the incompatibility of the Common Law and the Civilian mentalités, but another occasion will be 
required to address these issues. 
